{"id":12541,"date":"2023-09-16T13:36:05","date_gmt":"2023-09-16T13:36:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prosfunds.com\/business\/rethinking-neutrality-in-europe\/"},"modified":"2023-09-16T13:36:05","modified_gmt":"2023-09-16T13:36:05","slug":"rethinking-neutrality-in-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prosfunds.com\/?p=12541","title":{"rendered":"Rethinking neutrality in Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Welcome back. Urho Kekkonen, Finland\u2019s president from 1956 to 1982, once observed: \u201cThere are as many kinds of neutrality as there are neutral states.\u201d<\/p>\n

It was a perceptive point \u2014 but now, more than 18 months after Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, neutrality is either going out of fashion or stirring up controversy, at least in Europe. I\u2019m at tony.barber@ft.com.<\/p>\n

I stress \u201cat least in Europe\u201d, because elsewhere a certain kind of neutrality remains alive and well. When the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in February that called on Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine, some 141 states voted in favour and seven against \u2014 but 32 abstained.<\/p>\n

These included African and Asian states, such as Algeria and India, with a robust modern tradition of non-alignment. But they also included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, four central Asian states that were once under Moscow\u2019s thumb in the Soviet Union. The fifth \u201c-stan\u201d, Turkmenistan, preferred not to take part in the UN vote. In this way, the central Asian quintet signalled their desire to preserve national independence and not be sucked into great power rivalries.<\/p>\n

Matters stand differently in Europe, where most countries that embraced neutrality during the cold war are adapting their policies, sometimes quite dramatically so. This week, I will focus on Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland \u2014 but first, a few words on Finland and Sweden.<\/p>\n

Transformation of northern Europe<\/h2>\n

Finland joined Nato in April, becoming the US-led alliance\u2019s 31st member. Sweden is expected to follow suit, provided Turkey lifts its objections. Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 was the proximate cause of the Finnish and Swedish applications to join Nato, but in truth each country had been moving closer to the alliance since the end of the cold war.<\/p>\n

For Finland, which fought two wars with the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1944, it was about removing the restrictions on national independence deriving from a \u201cfriendship treaty\u201d signed with Moscow in 1948.<\/p>\n

<\/source>\"Former<\/picture>
Former Swedish prime minister Olof Palme was assassinated in Stockholm in 1986<\/span> \u00a9 AFP via Getty Images<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

For Sweden, whose tradition of neutrality dated to the first half of the 19th century, the Nato application involved a more profound political and psychological change. As Anna Wieslander, director for northern Europe at the Atlantic Council think-tank, put it last year, neutrality had given Sweden \u201ca special space for manoeuvre in international politics in terms of mediation, peace talks and arms control\u201d.<\/p>\n

During the cold war, no politician better embodied this Swedish self-image than Olof Palme, a Social Democrat who served a total of 11 years as prime minister between 1969 and 1986 \u2014 the year he was assassinated in Stockholm.<\/p>\n

Austria: no yearning for Nato entry<\/h2>\n

Palme\u2019s Austrian equivalent was Bruno Kreisky, a Socialist who served as foreign minister from 1959 to 1966 and chancellor from 1970 to 1983. During these long spells in office, Kreisky established Austria as a bridge between east and west and as the site of dozens of UN and other international organisations.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the country\u2019s full recovery of independence in 1955, after a 10-year occupation by the second world war Allies, was conditional upon its adoption of permanent neutrality, as explained by Gabriele Silini in this article for Mondo Internazionale.<\/p>\n

Now neutrality is under discussion in Austria as never before. In February, more than 90 politicians from across the spectrum, senior military officers and former high-ranking diplomats published an open letter urging a reconsideration of the country’s cherished neutrality.<\/p>\n

In July, Austria joined Switzerland in signing a declaration of intent to join Sky Shield, a European air defence system. Launched by Germany after Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the system is designed to allow European countries to buy defence systems together and engage in joint training.<\/p>\n

However, there is little appetite in Austria to follow Finland and Sweden into Nato. According to a poll published in May by the Austrian Society for Europe Policy, 60 per cent of Austrians are against joining Nato and only 21 per cent in favour.<\/p>\n

<\/source><\/source>\"Column<\/picture><\/figure>\n

It is noteworthy that these figures have hardly changed since 2021 (62 for, 23 per cent against) and 2022 (64 for, 17 per cent against), despite Russia\u2019s aggression in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Switzerland: strict neutrality under pressure<\/h2>\n

The Swiss tradition of neutrality is perhaps the most deeply entrenched of any European country \u2014 as set out with admirable clarity in this article by historian Marco Jorio for the Neue Z\u00fcrcher Zeitung.<\/p>\n

However, the government\u2019s strict interpretation of neutrality since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created some diplomatic tensions between Switzerland and its European friends. A case in point is the government\u2019s refusal in June to permit the export of almost 100 mothballed Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In a surprising twist to this story, it came to light last month that the government-owned armaments group Ruag had already sold 25 of these tanks to a Bavarian company.<\/p>\n

In terms of public opinion, support for neutrality remains high, as does opposition to formal Nato membership. However, in this survey conducted for the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, a public research university, we see that some 55 per cent of Swiss people support a \u201crapprochement\u201d with Nato \u2014 up from 45 per cent in 2021.<\/p>\n

<\/source><\/source>\"Line<\/picture><\/figure>\n

It\u2019s the first time that such a proposal has won majority backing in Switzerland.<\/p>\n

Precisely what \u201crapprochement\u201d with Nato might entail remains to be explained. But the Swiss political philosopher Katja Gentinetta caught the evolving mood of society well in an article in which she argued:<\/p>\n

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Switzerland\u2019s neutrality has become controversial \u2014 and rightly so. In light of the Russian attack on Ukraine, it has become morally and politically problematic.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Ireland: a presidential outburst<\/h2>\n

In June, I happened to be in Ireland when a political storm blew up over the neutrality question. It started when Michael D Higgins, the head of state, whose role is largely ceremonial, accused the government of allowing a dangerous \u201cdrift\u201d from Ireland\u2019s traditionally neutral defence policy.<\/p>\n

His intervention coincided with a government-organised forum on security issues that was chaired by Louise Richardson, a former vice-chancellor of Oxford university. Irish-born, she was awarded the title of Dame of the British Empire last year \u2014 an honour that Higgins implied made her biased in favour of official British views on security.<\/p>\n

Higgins later apologised for his remark, but the episode was revealing nonetheless. It showed how, for many Irish citizens, neutrality is tied to pride in the independence that was won from the British empire in the early 20th century.<\/p>\n

As in Austria and Switzerland, public support for neutrality remains strong but there is growing recognition that Ireland should increase its military capacity. At present, Irish defence expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product is one of the lowest in Europe (see the World Bank chart below) \u2014 though last year the government announced what it called the largest increase in the defence budget since independence.<\/p>\n

<\/source><\/source>\"Line<\/picture><\/figure>\n

Malta: no island is an island<\/h2>\n

And so to Malta. The Mediterranean island state\u2019s foreign policy strategy makes clear the government\u2019s firm view that neutrality, which is enshrined in the constitution, safeguards Malta\u2019s international role.<\/p>\n

Yet some changes may be on the horizon. In an eye-catching speech a week ago, Carmelo Inguanez, a senior Maltese diplomat, made the point that neutrality may become obsolete if the EU introduces far-reaching institutional reforms to permit Ukraine and other countries to join the bloc in years to come.<\/p>\n

If, for example, the necessity for unanimity on EU foreign policy decisions were to be abolished, \u201cMalta would have to obey and respect decisions taken by majority voting irrespective of its neutrality\u201d, Inguanez wrote.<\/p>\n

EU mutual defence<\/h2>\n

In fact, the EU\u2019s Lisbon treaty already contains a mutual defence clause (Article 42.7) under which member states are obliged to come to each other\u2019s assistance if one of them is attacked. But this clause has a provision protecting \u201cthe specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states\u201d \u2014 which can be read as an opt-out for neutral EU countries from the requirement of mutual defence.<\/p>\n

In summary, Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland all seem unlikely to emulate Finland and Sweden and apply to join Nato. But enhanced co-operation with the alliance, and closer integration into the EU\u2019s defence arrangements, are perfectly conceivable.<\/p>\n

One wonders whether Vladimir Putin took any of this into account when he invaded Ukraine.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

More on this topic<\/h2>\n

Ambiguous alliance: neutrality, opt-outs and European defence \u2014 a 2021 collection of essays edited by Clara Sophie Cramer and Ulrike Franke for the European Council on Foreign Relations<\/p>\n

Tony\u2019s picks of the week<\/h2>\n
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  • \n

    Singapore has prospered for decades as a hub of global finance and business, but risks are emerging as the city-state tries to respond to a more competitive and fragmented world, the FT\u2019s Mercedes Ruehl reports<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

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    Russia in wartime has concealed unflattering economic statistics from the public, but even some data deemed suitable for publication hint at difficulties for the economy, Karel Svoboda, Giangiuseppe Pili and Jack Crawford write for the Royal United Services Institute<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n